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Abstract: 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) are widely-deployed security tools for detecting cyber-attacks and 
activities conducted by intruders for observing network traffics. With the increase in network speed and number and 
types of attacks, existing NIDSs, face challenges of capturing every packet to compare them to malicious signatures. 
These challenges will impact on the efficiency of NIDSs, mainly the performance and accuracy power. 
      This paper presents an overview of how the performance of the Payload-based and Flow-based NIDSs is 
affected by the threats and attacks within the high-speed networks environment. The impact of these new technologies on 
the NIDSs will be described in terms of the NIDSs performance and accuracy. 
      Throughout the analysis of the literature on this topic, we found that the Packet-based NIDSs process every 
packet (payload) received. While it produces low false alarms, it is very time consuming, therefore it is hard, or even 
impossible, to perform packet-based approach at the speed of multiple Gigabits per second (Gbps). Flow-based NIDSs 
have an overall lower amount of data to be process, therefore it is the logical choice for high speed networks but it 
suffers from producing high false alarms. Therefore, it can be recommended that, a hybrid or a mixture model of both 
NIDSs may ensure a higher ability to react on the wider scope of attacks within the high-speed networks environment. 
Keywords: Network Intrusion Detection, Packet-Based, Flow-Based, High Speed Networks, Efficiency. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of Internet users is growing 
increasingly, along with new network services. Along 
with the wonderful benefits that the Internet gives, it 
also has its dark face. Since the Internet becomes bigger 
and bigger, network security attack threats have become 
more serious. Many security holes are exposed and 
misused by attacks. Recent reports on Internet security 
breaches indicate that the number and the damage cost 
are continuously rising [9]. Considering the damage 
cost caused by the attacks, it is important to detect 
attacks as soon as possible. For this purpose, Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) have been 
developed.  
  
   There are two methods basis on the source of 
data to be analyzed in NIDSs: packet-based NIDSs and 
flow-based. Packet-based NIDSs has to analyze the 
whole payload content beside headers. In flow NIDSs, 
rather than looking at all packets going through a 
network link, it looks at aggregated information of  
 
 
related packets of network traffic in the form of flow, so 
the amount of data to be analyzed is reduced [9]. 
      With the increase in network speed and 
number and types of attacks, existing NIDSs, face 
challenges of capturing every packet to compare them 
to malicious signatures. These challenges will impact 
on the efficiency of NIDSs, mainly the performance and 
accuracy power. 
      This paper presents an overview of how the 
performance and accuracy of the packet-based and 
flow-based NIDSs are affected by the threats and 
attacks within the high-speed networks environment.  
      This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents the concept and types of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs). This section also discusses about the 
IDSs efficiencies and challenges. Section 3 and 4 
explain the concept of packet-based NIDSs and flow-
based NIDSs, respectively. These sections also provide 
a discussion about the accuracy and performance in 
high-speed networks of packet-based and flow based. 
While section 5 shows the comparison between packet-
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based NIDSs and flow-based NIDSs, section 6 presents 
the conclusion of this work. 
 
2. INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEMS 
 
Intrusion Detection can be defined as the 
process of monitoring and identifying the computer and 
network events, to determine the emergence of any 
abnormal incident, as consequence, this unusual event is 
considered to be an intrusion. It can be defined as “the 
process of identifying and responding to malicious 
activity targeted at computing and networking 
resources” [1]. It detects unwanted exploitation to 
computer system, both through the Internet and Intranet. 
  
      A reader may question how IDSs differ from 
firewalls. Firewall is defined as piece of hardware or 
software program which functions in a networked 
environment to prevent some communication forbidden 
by the pre-defined security policy. Firewall differ in the 
sense that they don’t usually have capability to search 
for anomalies or specific content patterns, such as 
spamming and worms, to the same degree as IDSs do. 
For these reasons, IDSs must be at first line of defense 
and work along with firewalls. Unlike firewalls, they 
are automated because they don’t depend on human’s 
decision. [31].  
      An Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) detects 
the attacks similar to IDS. An IPS is the next security 
layer that combines the protection of firewalls with the 
monitoring ability of IDSs to protect networks with 
analysis necessary to make the proper decision on the 
fly. IPSs, also named Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention Systems (IDPSs), are design to sit in-line 
with traffic flows and prevent attacks in real-time. 
Unlike IDSs (passive IDSs only raise an alarm in case 
of an intrusion), IPSs block traffics independently 
without human interaction. Therefore, the main 
disadvantages of IPSs are the serious consequences 
when blocking useful traffics (when false alarms rise) 
beside its bad performance in high speed network [29] . 
Since we focus on IDS, this paper doesn’t consider IPS. 
 
2.1 IDS TYPES 
 
2.1.1 HOST-BASED AND NETWORK-
BASED 
 
In general, we can divide IDSs into two basic 
classes based on their position in the network or audit 
source location: host-based IDSs (HIDSs) and network-
based (NIDSs). HIDS monitors a single machine and 
audit data, such as resource usage and system logs, 
traced by the hosting operating system. On the other 
hand, NIDS, such as Snort, monitors a network and 
analysis the traffic which flows through the segment.  
 
      NIDSs have the following advantages: In 
contrast to HIDSs, the deployment of new host in 
network does not need more effort to monitor the 
network activity of that new host. Generally, it is easier 
to update one component of NIDSs than many 
components of HIDSs on hosts. 
      Since this paper focus on network flows and 
packets, we don’t consider host-based intrusion 
detection systems. 
Intrusion Detection 
System
Audit source 
location
Network-based
Host-based
Detection Model
Anomaly-based
Signature-based
Packet-based
Flow-based
 
Figure 1: IDS Taxonomy Reproduced from [28] (Dotted 
Red Line Indicates the Scope of our Work). 
2.1.2 SIGNATURE-BASED AND 
ANOMALY-BASED 
IDSs also can be classified based on its 
detection model into two categories: signature-based 
and anomaly-based. The signature-based IDSs, also 
named “misused-based”, works similar to anti-virus 
software. It employs a signature (pattern that 
correspond to a know threat) database of know attacks, 
and if a successful match with current input, an alert is 
raised. A well-know example of this type is Snort [26] 
which is an open source IDS that monitors network by 
matching each packet it observes against a set of rules.  
 
      Anomaly-based or behavior-based IDS works 
by building a model of normal traffic data pattern 
during a training phase, then it compares new inputs to 
the model. A significant deviation (change) is marked 
as an anomaly (abnormal or intrusion). Although 
Signature-based IDSs cannot detect unknown attacks, 
either because the database is out of date or because no 
signature is available yet, it has low false alarm (high 
accuracy). On the other hand, anomaly-based is able to 
detect unknown attacks but it suffers from producing 
false alarms [10], [20]. Possible reasons for traffic 
anomalies are: 
• Change in the network topology (e.g. routing 
changes or new connected hosts) 
• Network usage (e.g., changed customer behavior, 
new applications) 
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2.1.3 PACKET-BASED AND FLOW-
BASED 
There are two methods basis on the source of 
data to be analyzed in NIDSs: packet-based and flow-
based. Packet-based, also named “traditional NIDS”, 
has to inspect the whole payload content beside headers. 
In flow-based NIDS, rather than looking at all packets 
going through a network link, it looks at aggregated 
information of related packets of network traffic in the 
form of flow, so the amount of data to be analyzed is 
reduced [29]. Thus, Flows provide information and 
patterns about network connection (can be represented 
in just a few bytes) to be analyzed rather than packet 
payload. 
      Packet-based mostly provides signature-based 
NIDSs valuable information to detect attacks while 
flow-based support anomaly-based NIDSs to have 
ability to detect anomalies [2] [19]. 
      Details for these two methods are in Section 3 
and 4. Figure 1 shows IDS types that has been discussed 
in this paper (dotted red line in the figure indicate the 
scope of our work). Readers interested in further 
taxonomy of IDSs, which are outside the scope of this 
paper, can refer to [18] 
2.2 IDS EFFICIENCIES AND 
CHALLENGES  
An efficient NIDSs has two features [10]:  
• High Accuracy (Low False Alarms)  
• High Performance (High Speed of Auditing) 
Recent researches are still struggling to 
improve NIDSs to meet these two objectives. One of 
main requirement of NIDSs to achieve these objectives 
is scalability to high-speed networks. As network line 
speeds, as well as Internet traffic, continue to grow, the 
demand for faster security also increases. Most large 
corporations, universities, and government networks are 
moving toward speeds of up to 10Gbps. Researchers 
assess the current NIDSs processing potential to lie 
between 100Mbps and 200Mbps [14], [17]. Well-know 
NIDS like Snort [26] and Bro [23] show evidences of 
high resources consumption when deal with the 
overwhelming amount of data found in today’s high-
speed network [11]. 
      The high speed of the network traffic means 
that the NIDSs will receive a large amount of data that 
should be monitored and the identified. The NIDSs’ 
weak process ability is primarily because the analysis of 
network packets requires much computing. Thus, it is 
important to identify malicious packet in their early 
phases, which is feasible only in high speed routers 
[14]. Hence, it seems that the issue could be resolved by 
increasing the NIDS processor’s speed. Unfortunately, 
the speed of networks increases faster than the speed of 
processors. It’s not possible to keep up with the speed 
of network by just increase the CPU’s speed of NIDSs 
[17]. In addition, storing the traffic for further analysis 
of the packet payload requires vast amount of storage 
area.  
      The other issue that confronts NIDSs is the 
growth and fast emergence of new 
attacks/viruses/worms on the Internet. In signature-base 
detection, as the number of attacks increase, the number 
of malicious (intrusion) signatures increase in the 
database in NIDSs. Usually, these databases contain 
hundreds or thousands of signatures. An NIDS has to 
add these new signatures into its signature list quickly 
without disturbing its main function of detecting 
intrusion.  NIDSs then search for these signatures in 
network traffic to detect intrusions. To detect 
signatures, all network traffic must be compared with 
each and every signature to identify if a match exists or 
not.  
      This is very difficult particularly for today’s 
high speed networks with line speed of 10 Gbps and 
beyond [14]. As a result, when packets are not analyzed 
on time, NIDSs start to drop packets as soon as they fail 
to compare all the coming packets with the signatures. 
These dropped packets may have aggressive data with 
attack signatures, which causes a high false negative 
(when no alert raise but intrusion attempt takes place) 
rates in NIDSs [24] 
      It is obvious from the issues mentioned in this 
section that NIDSs should be able to handle the growth 
in Internet bandwidth as well as the increase in line 
speed and the growing number of attacks. Thus, there is 
an urgent need for higher process ability of NIDSs. 
3. PACKET-BASED NIDS 
3.1 HOW PACKET-BASED WORKS  
In packet-based NIDSs, all network packets 
passing a certain observation point such as a router are 
captured without any loss of information. The packet 
capture encompasses OSI (Open System 
Interconnection) layer 2 to 7. A packet has mainly two 
fields: the header which contains information about 
source, destination, and others, and the payload which 
contains the data. 
       
In packet-based, also named “Deep Packet 
Inspection” (DPI), the combination of header and 
payload scan determines whether a packet is an 
intrusion or not. Generally, this approach is realized by 
making use of software such as tcp dump [30]. 
Incoming packets are scanned and every single rule of 
the database is checked against it as shown in figure 2. 
In addition, signature-based, that discussed in section 
2.1.2, mostly apply packet-based process.   
 
      Packets capturing and analysis can take place 
at different locations such as routers, switches, and 
network monitors form which the resulting 
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measurement data is transported to a remote analysis 
system. 
 
H Payload
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Detection System
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Figure 2: Packet-Based NIDS, Adopted from [29]. 
 
3.2 PACKET-BASED AND DETECTION 
ACCURACY 
 
The main advantage of packet-based approach 
is that all common kinds of known attacks and 
intrusions practically can be detected if the data source 
deliver entire network packet for analysis. These ranges 
from attacks which are more connection-oriented to 
attacks occur only in network payload. Header 
information is mainly useful to recognize attacks aiming 
at vulnerabilities of the network stack implementation 
or scanning the operating system to identify active 
network services, On the other hand, payload 
information is most useful to identify active attacks 
against vulnerable application (since the connection that 
carries the attack is established in a normal way) [32]. 
However, the main disadvantage of packet-based is that 
it cannot detect unknown attack since it compare with 
predefined and known malicious signatures. 
  
3.3 PACKET-BASED IN HIGH-SPEED 
NETWORKS 
 
Since no information is lost in the monitored 
data, as we observed in section 3.1, it seems to be an 
advantage to this approach. But it is critical to note that 
more data does not automatically mean better results. 
The whole payload in every single incoming packet 
must be scanned. From the word “payload”, it implies 
that it “pays load” and overhead to the system. Every 
six months the network bandwidth is doubled [16], [15]. 
As a consequence, packet-based NIDSs must have high 
processing throughput so that they will be really fast 
and will not be the bottleneck for the network [16]. 
 
      However, vast amount of data require vast 
amount of computational performance particularly 
complex algorithm in the domain of machine learning. 
In other words, systems that are capable of monitoring 
every packet on a high-speed network are very 
expensive and high resource consumption. Moreover, a 
drop of packets will occur if the NIDSs speed is not 
high enough to let the analysis process be done [27].  
      Packet-based scheme are very time consuming, 
therefore should not utilized in high-speed links, except 
when using high cost specialized hardware in specific 
network link. However, these hardware devices are 
quite expensive. In addition to the above problems, the 
amount of data needed for storing packet traces is 
usually huge and often has prohibitive costs. Therefore, 
the efficiency in accessing such database for analyses is 
also critical. Another issue facing packet-based in high 
speed network is that signature matching is impossible 
for most cases of encrypted payload, degrading the 
detection performance of NIDSs. 
 
     Since packet-based method is mostly applied 
in signature-based detection, the issues mentioned 
above apply in signature-based NIDSs as well. To 
handle with these problems, some approaches are 
evolved to reduce the amount of data to be identified 
that will be discussed in the following section. 
 
3.4 RELATED WORKS 
 
A significant amount of research has been 
done in order to design efficient packet-based NIDSs 
that perform its tasks in high speed network. Since 
usually not all incoming packets are related to intrusion, 
filtering and sampling approaches are the most common 
algorithm that applied into packet-based method.  
 
      Filters select packet depending on specific 
packet properties, such as values of packet header 
fields. Sampling algorithm, in general, aim at choosing 
a subset of packets which allows assuming information 
of the entirety of all packets, such as the frequency of a 
specific packet property. If packet sampling is 
combined with payload analysis, the goal is to remove 
packets where we don’t expect to find any interesting 
content, and to keep all packet of potential interest.  
 
      Another attempts to tackle the packet-based 
issues is [3], by dividing packet-based method into two 
stages to perform it in efficient way, called pre-filtering. 
The concept is that instead of matching the incoming 
packet against entire rule-set, it matches against sup-set 
of rules. More researches on improving packet-based 
technique in high speed networks can be found in [4] 
[13], [14], [17], [25]. 
 
 
4. FLOW-BASED NIDS 
4.1 HOW FLOW-BASED WORKS 
Flow-based technique is widely deployed as 
data source in applications like network monitoring, 
traffic analysis and security [21]. This method is 
characterized by flow data or network flow. One 
important fact about network flow is that flows don’t 
provide any packet payload unlike packet-based 
approach. It rather relies on information and statistics of 
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network flows, therefore flow-based NIDSs also called 
“Network Behavior Analysis”.  
 
Network Intrusion 
Detection System
Database Profiles
Intrusion/ Not 
Intrusion
Unusual?
Exporter (probe) Collector
Flow 
records
 Figure 3: Flow-Based Components, Reproduced from 
[5] 
      A flow can be defined as a unidirectional data 
stream between two computer systems where all 
transmitted packets of this stream share the following 
characteristics: IP source and destination address, 
source and destination port number and protocol value 
[5]. Nowadays special measurement systems are able to 
provide other characteristics in addition to the above, 
for instance: 
• The number of packets and amount of bytes 
transferred in a flow 
• The start and end time of a flow (in milli-
second) 
• The disjunction of all TCP flog occurring in 
the flow 
These systems export these information in the 
form of NetFlow [8] or IPFIX [7] records, called “flow 
record”, to NIDSs to analyze them. These analysis 
systems can then be used to detect intrusion. NetFlow 
and IPFIX are two protocols that specify the preparation 
and exportation format of flows. This software can be 
embedded in any NetFlow-enabled switch or router. 
 
      A Net-Flow setup consists of two components: 
an exporter and a collector. The flow exporter (can be a 
probe, a switch, or a router) extracts the headers from 
each incoming packet seen on the monitored interface. 
The exporter is responsible for creating flow records 
from observed traffic and sends them over the network 
to the collector.  The collector stores these flow records, 
received from the exporter, and make suitable for NIDS 
for further analysis as shown in figure 3. 
 
4.2 FLOW-BASED AND DETECTION 
ACCURACY 
Since flows only provide information about 
behavior of connection and no packet payload, attacks 
which are detectable exclusively in packet-based cannot 
be detected. In other word, any attack that only injected 
in payload will not be identified in flow-based method. 
For example, popular web-based attacks which base 
upon the injection of malicious code into website can be 
invisible on flow-based. The attack patterns (malicious 
code) are only visible inside the packet payload. 
However, the attack might be detectable on flow-based 
if the attacker execute multiple attacks in parallel and 
causes many flows targeting the server [28].  
      Since flow-based are limited to information 
regarding network interactions, this information, 
however, is still possible to identify communication 
patterns between hosts. For many attacks this 
information is sufficient. In addition, many flow-based 
NIDSs have the ability to detect anomaly-based attacks. 
[2], [19] have presented an anomaly-based detection 
solution that relies on network flow-based data exported 
from NetFlow enabled-devices. There are intrusions 
which can easily be detected on flow-base. Such attacks 
are, Denial of Service (DoS), computer worms, network 
probing and flooding [28]. To understand how flows are 
used to detect attacks, you can refer to [28]. 
      Moreover, unlike packet-based NIDSs, 
anomaly NIDSs using flow-based can detect unknown 
attacks. However, the main disadvantage of this 
technique is that it often suffers from increased false 
alarms.  
4.3 FLOW-BASED IN HIGH SPEED 
NETWORK 
Compared to packet-based method, flow-based 
deal with fraction of the total amount of data needs to 
be monitored and processed. For example, [28] 
calculated, in a high speed university network, that the 
ratio between packets exported by NetFlow (containing 
flow records) and the packet on the network is in 
average equal 0.1%. Furthermore, considering the 
network load measured in bytes, the overhead due to 
NetFlow is in average 0.2%. For this reason, 
performance issues in flow-based method are not a 
primary concern and therefore it is the logical choice for 
high-speed networks.  
 
      In addition, since flow-based data is very 
lightweight, the storage issues that appeared in packet-
based approach are almost disappeared. Also unlike 
packet-based, encrypted payload does not influence the 
operability of flow-based NIDSs. 
 
      What must be kept in mind is that, as discussed 
in section 4.1, the flow records are generated in the 
exporter, therefore no performance overhead from 
computational resources occurs in NIDSs. It can be said 
that NetFlow largely offloads the task from the machine 
running the NIDS to the probe device [5]. For example, 
if routers are used for generating the flow records, its 
resources will be consumed on it, potentially having a 
negative effect on the routing itself and effecting overall 
network performance. To reduce this negative effect on 
the exporter, sampling process is used that supported by 
NetFlow. Thereby, only a subset of the packets is 
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considered for flow generating, thus reducing the load 
on the router resources [6]. 
  
4.4 RELATED WORKS 
For high speed networks, it is important to 
explore alternative to packet-based inspection for 
efficient NIDSs. One option that currently attracts the 
attention of researchers is flow-based intrusion 
detection. Since the absence of the payload contributes 
some advantages to flow-based such as scalability to 
high speed network, it also means that the flow-based 
NIDSs have difficulties identifying certain types of 
attack. 
      The issues mentioned above encourage 
researchers to enhance flow-based accuracy. Although 
researches in this area still relatively in its beginning, 
many of them achieved highly promising results in 
intrusion detection while focusing on flow-based data 
source especially to detect anomaly-based attacks.  
      In [28], it provides a comprehensive survey 
about current research in the domain of flow-based 
NIDSs. Mayung et al [22] suggests that by aggregating 
packets of the identical flow, one can identify the 
abnormal traffic pattern that appears during attacks. The 
two main examples of anomaly-based Denial of Service 
(DoS) detection in high speed networks, using flow-
based only, are [19] and [33]. In [12], they developed a 
framework intended for detecting computer worms. 
Finally, [2] considered the effect of intelligent flow-
based sampling techniques on anomaly detection. 
   
5. COMPARISON BETWEEN FLOW-
BASED AND PACKET-PASED IN 
NIDS 
In table 1, we present a comparison of flow-
based and packet-based of accuracy and performance 
aspects. To sum up, if we examine the shortcomings of 
both intrusion detection techniques, we discover a 
tradeoff between the flow-based NIDSs with only 
limited, aggregated data available for detecting 
intrusions and with higher speed of auditing, while in 
packet-based side we pay for additional data with 
higher resources consumption. We therefore expect a 
potential in mixing both approaches to detect at least the 
same quantity of attacks while consuming less 
resources. 
  
Flow-Based Intrusion 
Detection 
Packet-Based Intrusion 
Detection 
Flow records contain 
aggregated data up to 
transport layer (layer 4 
in OSI) 
 
Packets contain all 
complete payload and 
headers up to 
application layer (layer 
7 in OSI). It therefore, 
considered more 
flexible in application 
of intrusion detection 
patterns. 
 
Since the data 
availability is limited in 
NIDSs, defining 
accurate detection rules 
is not possible in all 
cases. This may result in 
a reduced alert 
confidence and higher 
number of false alarms.  
Since the complete data 
is available, defining 
accurate detection can 
be on any part on traffic 
resulting in less false 
alarms and a higher 
alert confidence. 
 
To process flow records, 
one must have an 
additional component of 
probe (exporter), see 
figure 3. On the NIDS 
side, the data must be 
first decoded. Therefore, 
the complexity is 
generally higher. 
 
Packet-based NIDSs 
can be implemented 
easily without having 
any additional 
component to 
necessarily decode any 
protocol first. 
The generation of flow 
records introduces a 
delay between the 
moment the first packet 
of a connection is 
established and the time 
when the record reaches 
the NIDSs. Depending 
on the configuration, 
record may be released 
after the connection has 
been closed o timed out. 
 
The complete data is 
available to NIDSs 
immediately without 
delay. 
 
Encrypted payload does 
not influence the 
operability of flow-
based NIDSs 
 
Signature matching is 
impossible for most 
cases of encrypted 
payload, degrading the 
detection performance 
of NIDSs. 
 
Pre-filtering and 
aggregating flows are 
offloaded to the 
NetFlow probe device. 
The probe therefore 
must be measured 
adequately in order to 
reliably process amount 
of traffic flowing 
without lowering 
network performance. 
 
Filtering and 
aggregating are 
maintained completely 
on the NIDSs machine 
itself. Pre-filtering is 
often implemented by 
using expensive 
hardware accelerate 
device such as FPGA. 
Flow-based NIDSs have 
an overall lower amount 
of data to process, also 
in the analysis stage, 
because part of 
processing is outsourced 
to the probe device. 
Therefore, resource 
Packet-based NIDSs, in 
most cases when no 
hardware pre-filter is 
used, must process 
every packet received, 
possibly generating a 
huge workload on the 
NIDSs. Therefore, 
329 
consumption is 
generally low. 
 
resource consumption is 
generally high. 
 
There are less privacy 
issues with flow-based 
method, as much of the 
potentially confidential 
content of connection 
never leave the 
transmission network. 
 
Packet-based NIDSs 
receive the full payload 
data of every packet 
that may contain private 
data. 
 
 
Table 1: Flow-Based and Packet-Based NIDS 
Comparison, Collected from [28], [5], [27]. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents an overview of how the 
performance and accuracy of the Packet-based and 
Flow-based NIDSs are affected by the threats and 
attacks within the high-speed networks environment.  
      It was obvious from the literature that the 
current NIDSs should be able to handle the growth in 
Internet bandwidth as well as the increase in line speed 
and the growing number of attacks. Thus, there is an 
urgent need for higher process ability of NIDSs.  
      Packet-based NIDSs must process every 
packet (payload) received. While it produces low false 
alarms, it is very time consuming, therefore it is hard, or 
even impossible, to perform packet-based approach at 
the speed of multiple Gigabits per second (Gbps). Flow-
based NIDSs have an overall lower amount of data to 
be processed, therefore it is the logical choice to work at 
high speed networks but it has less input information 
available to detect attacks and besides it suffers from 
producing high false alarms. 
      Basically, we could state a tradeoff between 
availability of limited data of flow-based techniques, 
which have negative effect on accuracy of NIDSs, and 
full data of packet-based which lead to a higher 
resources consumption. Therefore we believe that flow-
based detection should not substitute the packet-based 
one in high speed environment, however, combination 
model to combine both approaches to power their 
advantages and overcome their drawbacks is suggested.  
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